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Abstract
The purpose of this article is to develop a vertical di¤erentiation model in order to understand
the competition and environmental impacts of the multiplication of ecological labels within a given
economic sector. We focus on the studing of the informational contents of these ecological labels and
if they reect or not the true o¤ered environmental qualities. Two situations are considered. The rst
one, is a benchmark case, where we assume that information is complete (the consumers know the
true qualities produced by the rms). The second, common situation, corresponds to a situation of
incomplete information where the consumers do not know the true environmental qualities presented
but use the price signal in order to approach environmental qualities. Our results show that: in the
case of complete information the introduction of a second ecological label in a market improves the
environmental qualities o¤ered by the two rms. In the case of incomplete information, the introduction
of a second label led to an increase in prices practiced by the two rms and a reduction in environmental
qualities of both rms. This situation needs specic regulation and that information must be revealed
by a benevolent social planer.
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Nomenclature
i = H;L : represents the rm that o¤ers the high environmental (H) or the low (L) environmental
quality.
LH : high environmental quality label.
LL : low environmental quality label.
i : rms i prot
qi: quality of good i.
pi : price of good i.
F (qi) : Fixed cost to obtain the label Li
ci : marginal production cost of the quality of the product i.
 : quality taste parameter.
U(qi; pi; ) : utility of a consumer with type :
~ : marginal consumer who is indi¤erent between high or low environmental quality.
Di : demand function for good i.
pHC : price of the product H at the equilibrium of the complete information case.
pLC : : price of the product L at the equilibrium of the complete information case.
DLC : demand function of L at the equilibrium of the complete information case.
DHC : : demand function of L at the equilibrium of the complete information case.
HC : Firms H prot at the equilibrium of the complete information case.
LC : Firms L prot at the equilibrium of the complete information case.

 
pH ; pL

: is the posterior believes of the consumers that the rm which plays pH o¤ers the high
environmental good whereas the other which plays pL is a low environmental quality one.
HI : Firms H prot at the equilibrium of the incomplete information case.
LI : Firms L prot at the equilibrium of incomplete information case.
H(pH ; pL; 
 
pH ; pL

): rms H prot when H xes its price at pH , and L o¤ers a product at price
pL:
() : quality that consumers expect to obtain.
DI(p; p): demand function when prices give no information concerning quality.
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1 Introduction
Eco-labels are nowadays widespread worldwide and participate in changing the patterns of consumption
in most EOCD Countries (EOCD, 1997). They exist for a variety of products such as batteries, textile,
paper, wood products, sheries and tourism. . . Their primarily goal is to solve the adverse selection
problem and to give the consumers the information they need in order to make the right choice in the
market. This policy is successful for a large variety of eco-labels (Teisl et al. 2002, Bjorner et al. 2002).
However, for a decade we have observed the multiplicity of eco-labels in a single market and for the
same category of products. For example, in the German electricity market three alternative labels co-exist
(Grüner Storm Label, Energie Vision, OK Power. . . ) (Tru¤er et al. 2001). This is also the case for wood
products where two eco-labels are competing (FSC and PEFC). Countries like Sweden have three o¢ cial
competing eco-labels: the ower Pan European eco-label, the Swedish falcon and the Nordic Swan.
The International Standardization Organisation (ISO) is aware of the multiplicity of eco-labelling and
distinguishes between three di¤erent types of eco-labels. Eco-labels type I are those based on a voluntary
multi-criteria product life cycle assessment of environmental e¤ects with verication by a third party.
Producers, importers, and retailers of products and services base eco-labels type II on self-environmental
claims. Eco-labels type III provide quantied product information according to pre-set indices similar to
consumer information on product packaging. The co-existing of such eco-labels in a single market may
lead to a confused situation where asymmetric information remains unsolved. Consumers are not able to
distinguish between the di¤erent eco-labels and their informational contents.
Agriculture and Food products are also subject to such dynamics and a great variety of eco-labels
exist (Nilson, 2004 ; Van Amstel et al. 2006). For example, ve competing eco-labels exist for arable
farming in Europe (EurepGAP1, Demeter2, EKO3, MK4 and ESP5). Farmers and rms are using them
di¤erently depending on competition setting and their initial production conditions. Food scarcity and
diseases may lead rms to communicate their production methods and contents more through eco-labels
(Nilson, 2004).
These dynamics raise several questions both at theoretical and economic policy view.
From a theoretical point of view two questions at least need to be answered. First, what are the
environmental values of the additional eco-labels? Do they improve or harm the environment? How
do consumers solve their informational dilemma when they take into account the di¤erent eco-labels?
Second, how the additional labels impacts the competition in the market. From an empirical view, one
can ask what could be the optimal policies vis-à-vis these new voluntary approaches if they do not reach
their environmental goals? Do we need regulation of voluntary approaches?
Starting from these observations, the aim of our paper is to challenge this point and to develop a
theoretical model capturing the environmental and competition e¤ects of the multiplicity of eco-labels in
a given industry. Little attention was given to this specic point in the economic literature. Our main
result shows that in the perfect information case the additional eco-label benets environmental qualities
and an increase in the environmental performance is observed. However in the asymmetric information
1EurepGAP: is a label for the certication of agricultural products around the globe. The main goal of this label is
to reduce detrimental environmental impacts of farming operations, optimize the use of inputs and to ensure a responsible
approach to worker health and safety (www.eurepgap.org).
2Demeter: is an eco-label for the bio dynamic agriculture. It aims to take care to the earth; to regenerate the earth, to
better integrate animalsagriculture and the cultivation of the soil in a same area. (www.bio-dynamie.org)
3EKO: The " SKAL International Foundation " (Netherlands) monitors and examines the biologic and organic production
of the entire world. This foundation gives the eco-label EKO.
4MK: is an eco-label, which is based on life cycle analysis.
5ESP: "Recognized Regional Product"
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case rms will practice "Greenwashing"6. The multiplicity of eco-labels could lead to a price increase in
the market and a reduction in environmental qualities.
The present paper is structured as follows. Section two presents the literature review and shows
the need for a specic model of the multiplicity of eco-labels. Section three develops a general model.
Section four deals with the benchmark case (the model with complete information case). Section ve
develops the incomplete information model. We compare the case of complete and incomplete information.
Section six concludes.
2 Literature review
The existing literature on ecological labelling has never developed a theoretical model of this specic case.
However, several papers have considered the borders of this issue.
The rst set of articles focused on the information value of the eco-labels.
Ibanez and Stenger (2000) studied the information impacts of the eco-labels through a vertical dif-
ferentiation model in three di¤erent information situations: complete, imperfect and partial. They try
to understand if information on food safety is consistent with a higher level of environmental quality of
the agriculture. They showed on one hand, that labelling could be e¢ cient from an environmental point
of view: it depends on the proportion of high environmental quality products in the market. On the
other hand, they showed that the labelling policy can decrease consumersurplus. However, a possible
extension of their work is the informational content of two eco-labels. Consumers cannot always infer
correctly high attributes from labelled products. Producers can be willing to cheat and claim false value
of their environmental qualities through labels.
Bougherara, Grolleau and Tjiébaut (2005) have studied the general impact of the consumption of two
di¤erent goods on the environment when labelling schemes are introduced. They have shown that the net
e¤ect on the environment is worse than without labelling schemes. Firstly, this article di¤ers from ours in
the analytical framework. Indeed, the authors have developed the concept of the environmental elasticity
of demand in order to study this specic case. Secondly, the authors have assumed that consumers
preferences are identical. Thirdly, the authors have not studied the problem of the asymmetric information
linked to the presence of two eco-labels. So what happens when there are two di¤erentiated products
di¤ering by their eco-labels type and two kinds of consumers (concerned and unconcerned)?
Heyes and Maxwell (2004), compare the environmental implications and social welfare of the World
Environmental Organization (WEO) labelling and the Non-GovernmentalNGO labelling. They an-
alyze the interaction between these two approaches when WEO is subject to pressure from rms. They
have shown that if each of these approaches do not depend from the other then the presence of the NGO
induces a resistance toward the WEO and this case may reduce social welfare. If these two approaches
run in parallel then it may reduce the resistance of the producers towards the WEO labelling which in-
creases welfare. However, they have not studied the impact of the co-existence of both eco-labels on the
environment and on the competition.
Mason (2006) studies a market under asymmetric information where technologies are xed and output
are not in which rms decide to choose an eco-label or not. Mason has shown that the social welfare
can increase or decrease when eco-labelling option is introduced. This depends upon parameter values
and the decision to choose the production technology. However, he has not studied the problem of the
asymmetric information due to the introduction of a second eco-label in the market.
Our paper is extending this line of research.
6The Green washing means that producers sell a product that seems to be more environmentally friendly than it really.
Boulding and Kirmani (1993), have demonstrated that the consumers do not perceive warranties as a credible signal of
product quality. Cason and Ganghadaran (2002) have shown that greenwashing is due some passivity of the regulation of
the environmental claims. All these authors have not studied the e¤ect of greenwashing due to the presence of two eco-labels
in the market.
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The second set of articles studied the strategic interaction in the di¤erent stages of the eco-labelling
program. They study the e¤ect of an eco-label on competition between rms.
Amacher et al. (2004) have studied the conditions of eco-labelling through a vertical di¤erentiation
model with two rms using eco-labels. They showed that if rms have the same xed cost then they
will always invest. If one rm is more e¢ cient then the other in investments, then the other rm will
invest or not depending on the unit investment cost. They have shown that in this case quality dispersion
remains unchanged but generally rms are incited to di¤erentiate more in order to relax price competition.
They have shown that eco-labelling increases the environmental qualities that are too low. However,
the existence of a second eco-label may impact the price competition and the environmental quality
competition. Firms can therefore have an opportunistic behaviour. Our paper contributes to this line of
research and shows that rms which compete with two di¤erent eco-labels are incited to cheat.
Ben Youssef and Lahmandi-Ayed (2008) show that rms may lobby at the criteria denition stage in
order to modify the competition setting. They found that several issues are possible. Firms, which are
not satised at the criteria stage, may try to develop their own label. The authors mention this issue but
they have not give any theoretical model.
Brien and Teisl (2004) study the environmental certication and eco-labelling for forest products.
Their results show that changes in eco-labelling policies a¤ect the consumers willingness to pay. As an
extension of their work one may expect that the presence of a second eco-label may impact the consumers
willingness to pay.
Arora and Gangopadhay (1994) has developed a model of overcompliance in a two stage game. In this
game, consumers can value the environmental quality. They have shown that under these assumptions,
the market is segmented and that the rm with the lower cost always overcomplies. However, these
authors do not study the case where the consumers cannot value the environmental quality due to the
presence of two eco-labels in the market.
Nilson et al. (2004) analyze the credibility of the increased number of eco-labels in the food industry.
They conclude that a great number of consumers fail to nd the real information due to the presence
of several eco-labels. We can extend this work by studying the willingness to cheat by the producers
who are using these eco-labels. Does the presence of several eco-labels in the industry incite the di¤erent
producers to cheat and to produce a lower environmental quality that it is claimed through the eco-label?
Our article partially gives some answers this issue.
More recently and particularly in matter of Food and agricultural products, Van Amstel et al. (2006)
compare the informational content of ve eco-labels in the food industry. They conclude that the eco-
labels fail to survey the message of the environmental impacts to consumers. Three complementary issues
are developed in our article. First, Amstel et al. (2006) gives empirical ndings without modelling the
situation. Our article gives the analytical arguments for their ndings. Secondly, our work analyzes
theoretically the impacts of the multiplicity of labels on the global environmental quality. Thirdly, when
the eco-labels fail to survey the message of the environmental impacts to consumers, are the producers
incited to cheat? We consider this issue also.
3 The structure of the model
In this section, we introduce the main assumptions of a vertical di¤erentiation model where the environ-
mental quality is the element of discrimination. We begin by analyzing rmsbehaviour after what we
present the consumersbehavior.
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3.1 Firmsbehaviour
We suppose here that there are two ecolabels, each rm adopts one of them.
For simplicity, we suppose that two rms are sharing the market and are producing the same good.
Firm H o¤ers the high environmental quality
 
qH

good at price pH with an eco-label (LH) and a rm L
is producing a low environmental quality
 
qL

at price pL good with an eco-label (LL) 7.
We assume that the two labels LH and LL are di¤erent. For illustration, suppose that LH is the
o¢ cial label (type I), and LL is the label of type II e.g. it is developed by a group of rms. We can
suppose for example that the two rms adopt the ecolabels EKO and MK.
We assume that qH > qL and that qi 2 [0;1] where i = H;L:
We assume that rm H investment cost8 is F (qH) = aqH
2
where a > 0 to obtain the label LH : Firm
L has also an investment cost F (qL) = aqL
2
where  > 0 to obtain the eco-label LL: This xed costs can
be interpreted as the necessary cost to adopt the label and to maintain it.
 reects the e¢ ciency of the rm L in term of investment in quality. If   1 then L is e¢ cient in
investment and invests in the impovment of environmental quality whereas if  > 1 then L is not e¢ cient
in investment and invests weakly in environmental quality. Finally, we assume that L does not invest too
much in environmental quality e.g.  > 1 since it provides the low environmental quality.
In order to focus on investment decisions in quality, we assume that the marginal cost of quality is
constant and for simplicity let this cost normatized to zero: cH = cL = 0:
3.2 Consumersbehaviour
We assume that consumers have a weak ecological awareness in the sense that they all prefer the most
environment friendly product if they have the choice between several "environmental qualities" sold at
the same price. Thus we model this situation by using an appropriate vertical di¤erentiation model. In
this model, all consumers buy almost one unit of the product. The consumers are identied by a taste
parameter  for the environmental quality. We assume that  is uniformly distributed on [0; 1] : The
consumers pay pi for environmental quality qi (i = H;L).
We consider, as Mussa and Rosen (1978) that indirect utility of a consumer of type  buying from
rm i (i = H;L) a unit good of environmental quality qi at price pi is given by:
U(qi; pi; ) = qi   pi where i = H;L:
Let ~ the taste parameter which, represents the marginal consumer who is indi¤erent between high
or low environmental quality.
7There are two kinds of labels: endogenous and exogenous (Kirchho¤ 2000).
Endogenous Labels are created by the rm itself (Label type II or III). In this case one can not monitor rms claim and
moral hazard arises. Firms can claim producing a certain level of quality through its eco-label but o¤ers really another level
of environmental quality. In this case, rm can uses greenwashing".
Exogenous or third party Labeling is created by a third party and independant labeling authority (label type I). Under
these systems the third party authority denes the criteria of the eco-label for di¤erent products and the rm can apply for
a license to use the eco-label (eco-label Blue Angel for example) if it gives the evidence that its product is conform with the
eco-label. In the two types of eco-labels rms can cheat but if its labels is a third party labeling authority than its licence
to use the label is withdrawn. A rm can then select a type of eco-label but o¤ers a di¤erent environmental quality. The
exogenous label is also more credible for consumers than the endogenous label.
8We assume also that the two rms have an investment cost F (qi) where i = H;L:
Like Ronnen (1991), we suppose that the investment costs F (qi) and that the marginal investment costs F 0
0
(qi) where
i = H;L are increasing with quality for all qi 2 [0;1] and i = H;L: We assume also that F 000(qi)  0:
The investment costs has a quadratic form. This particular form is necessary for the existence and the uniqueness of the
equilibrium (Ronnen (1991).
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We have ~ = p
H pL
qH qL : We suppose that the market is not entirely covered. The consumers whose
 2
h
pL
qL
; ~
i
buy the good of environmental quality qL: The consumers whose  2
h
~; 1
i
buy the good of
environmental quality qH : The consumers whose  2 0; pL dont buy the good.
Thus the demands functions for low and high environmental quality respectively are given by:
DL(pL; pH ; qL; qH) = ~   pL
qL
= p
H pL
qH qL   p
L
qL
(2:1)
DH(pH ; pL; qH ; qL) = 1  ~ = 1  pH pL
qH qL (2:2)
In the next section, we will develop situation where the information is complete.
4 The complete information case
In this section, we develop a model where all consumers are able to know perfectly the environmental
qualities qL and qH : The game is like the followings: in the rst step, rms H and L with eco-labels LH
and LL compete in environmental qualities. In the second stage, the two rms compete in prices. In
the third stage, the consumer choose to buy the good H or L or not to buy. The aim of this section is
to understand the e¤ective impacts of two di¤erents eco-labels on the environmental qualities when the
consumers know perfectly the quality levels.
4.1 Price choice: the equilibrium prices
The prot of rm H is given by:
H(pH ; pL; qH ; qL) = pHDH(pH ; pL; qH ; qL)  aqH2 (3:1)
The prot of rm L is given by:
L(pL; pH ; qL; qH) = pLDL(pL; pH ; qL; qH)  aqL2 (3:2)
We resolve the game by backward induction. We start by resolving the second stage of the game in
which rms choose their prices in function of their preceding choice of qualities; we obtain the following
equilibrium prices9:
pHC = 2q
H(qH qL)
4qH qL (3:3)
pLC = q
L(qH qL)
4qH qL (3:4)
Through the results (3.3) and (3.4), we found that pHC > pLC : In fact, pLC = 12
qL
qH
pHC . This implies
that the low quality rm xes a price that is bellow the half of the price imposed by the rm H. We note
at the same time that the more qL is closer to qH the more our model tends to be a Bertrand model
where prices are equal to marginal costs normalized here to zero (the Bertrand paradox).
The demand functions at the equilibrium of the complete information case are:
DHC = 2q
H
4qH qL (3:5)
DLC = q
H
4qH qL (3:6)
The quantity sold by rm L is equal to the half of the quantity sold by the high environmental quality
rm.
Finally, the equilibrium prots are:
HC(qH ; qL) =
4qH
2
(qH qL)
(4qH qL)2   aq
H2 (3:7)
9The proofs are given in the annex A1.
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LC(qL; qH) =
qLqH(qH qL)
(4qH qL)2   aq
L2 (3:8)
We note RHC =
4qH
2
(qH qL)
(4qH qL)2 and R
LC =
qLqH(qH qL)
(4qH qL)2 the revenues of the high and the low environ-
mental qualities respectively.
We have @R
HC
@qL
=  4 q
H2(4qH qL)(2qH qL)
(4qH qL)4 < 0 (3:9)
and
@RLC
@qH
=
qL(4qH qL)

6qH 2qL+8qH3+8qH2qL2

(4qH qL)4 > 0 (3:10)
(3.9) implies that a reduction in qL increases rms H revenue.
(3.10) implies that an increase in qH increases rms L revenue.
These results mean that the more the products are di¤erentiated in term of environmental qualities
the more competition in prices is relaxed and the more the rms increase their revenues as Amacher et
al. (2004). We can conclude here that despite the presence of the two eco-labels in the market, rms
must maximise the di¤erentiation between their environmental qualities to a maximum. The presence of
a second ecolabel improves the hole performance of the sector in matter of environment. From this point,
one may conclude that the best solution for rm H is to abandon its ecolabel and to choose the minimum
environmental quality. This result is also nd in di¤erent analysis like Ben Youssef and Lahmandi-Ayed
(2008).
In the next section, we will study the equilibrium environmental qualities in the case of complete
information.
4.2 The existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium in quality
In the rst stage of the game rms compete simultaneously in quality. Each rm xes its quality taking
the quality of the other rm as given.
The prots of rm H and L are respectively:
HC(qH ; qL) =
4qH
2
(qH qL)
(4qH qL)2   aq
H2 (3:7)
LC(qL; qH) =
qLqH(qH qL)
(4qH qL)2   aq
L2 (3:8)
Equations (3.7) and (3.8) are equivalent to:
HC(qH ; qL) = RHC   aqH2 (3:11)
LC(qL; qH) = RLC   aqL2 (3:12)
Nash equilibrium in environmental qualities must satisfy the following rst order conditions:
@HC
@qH
= @R
HC
@qH
  2aqH = 0 (3:13)
@LC
@qL
=
@RLC
@qL
  2aqL = 0 (3:14)
In this case, we notice that optimal qualities are obtained by equalizing marginal cost of investment
in environmental quality and marginal revenue.
The second order and stability conditions are globally satised10.
There is a unique equilibrium since
@RHC
@qH
and
@RLC
@qL
are positives11. The question is now to know if
there is a unique equilibrium in quality.
10 the proofs are given in the Annex A2.
11The proofs are given in the Annex A2.
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Thus if quality qH is an equilibrium it must satisfy
@RHC
@qH
= 2aqH :
At the same time, if quality qL is an equilibrium it must satisfy
@RLC
@qL
= 2aqL:
The slopes of the reaction functions in quality space are given by:
@qH
@qL
=  
@2RHC
@qH@qL
@2HC
@qH2
> 0
@qL
@qH
=  
@2RLC
@qL@qH
@2LC
@qL2
> 0
The reaction functions have positive slopes, which implies that the products are strategic complements.
Indeed, since an increase in qL reduces the di¤erence qH   qL and intensies price competition, rm H
has an incentive to increase its environmental quality in order to relax price competition. Taking into
account that we are in the complete information case, rm L must invest in environmental quality. Since
 > 1; the more  tends to 1; and the more rm L will be e¢ cient and the more quality qL will be high
and consequently the more rm H will invest in quality in order to increase its quality and then to relax
price competition.
PROPOSITION 1: In the complete information case, the introduction of a second eco-
label in the market increases the environmental quality of the two rms and subsequently
the global environmental quality.
This result is very important since it shows that when there are several eco-labels in the market, and
if the rms o¤er the product with the real environmental quality proposed by each eco-label than the
global environmental quality will be raised. If rms do not pratice opportunistic behavior (if each rm
o¤ers its product with the environmental quality announced in the eco-label) then the presence of several
eco-labels will increase the global environmental quality.
In the next section, we will develop the incomplete information case. We will assume that consumers
know that there are two eco-labels in the market but they dont know which rm produces the high
environmental quality and which one o¤ers the low environmental quality.
5 The incomplete information case
5.1 Denition: the model and the assumptions
By incomplete information or asymmetric information, we mean the situation where the consumers are
not able to observe the true qualities. When consumers face several eco-labels, the information cost is
prohibitive and they have no ability to associate an environmental quality to a special ecolabel. We
suppose here that there is no reputation e¤ects. The presence of two or several di¤erent eco-labels in
the market leads the consumers to ask themselves about the value of the ecological information of these
labels. Each producer claims o¤ering a high environmental quality through its own eco-label. But who
tells the truth? Consumers are uncertain about the truthfulness of these eco-labels. They will not know
which label really increases the environmental quality. The most important question here is what kind
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of eco-labels gives the higher value? The cost of verifying the environmental performance of the rm
is prohibitive for consumers. For example in the food industry, the eco-labels criteria are di¤erent
depending on which label it is. Some stresses on the presence of pesticide residue, others on the additives
and preservatives but they all pretend to be environmentally friendly. How will do consumers to know
that each rm is not "greenwashing" (Van Amstel et al. (2006), Kirchho¤ (2000))
We assume that the consumers have no information on the environmental qualities of the eco-
labels LL and LH : Indeed, consumers can be confused or will not take into account the eco-label. They
dont know which eco-label corresponds to the high environmental quality12 . Their basic belief is that
the two eco-labels are di¤erent and that one is more performing than the other. The only observable
variable is prices. They may have an initial belief about the performance of each rm. Intuitively, we
think that the consumers will observe the prices to infer qualities levels. The consumers observe price pL
of rm L which o¤ers the label LL; and the price pH of the rm H which o¤ers the label LH : In this case,
consumers have di¤used believes on the identity of the high environmental quality rm. Actually, they
dont know which rm is the high environmental quality rm and which one is the low environmental
quality rm. They will observe the price vector (pH ; pL) to update their believes. We assume that a priori
for the consumers there is a fty percent chance that rm H or L has a high environmental quality. There
is a broad literature on price as a signal of quality. Daughety and Reinganum (1995) give a model in
which quality can be interpreted as safety. They have shown that higher prices signal safer products when
consumers support a su¢ ciently high portion of the loss. Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001) develop a
model with two rms where consumers dont know the quality of each rm. They have shown that the
model has several equilibrium. Fluet and Garella (2002) have used price and advertising to signal quality.
They show that when the price di¤erence is small, advertising is necessary to signal quality. However, all
these authors have not studied the case of signaling environmental quality through prices. In the present
paper, it is the presence of two eco-labels in the market that makes it unbelievable for the consumer.
Hence the consumers use the price as a signal for quality.
Mahenc (2008) has studied prices as signals of environmental performances for polluting products.
He has shown that high environmental performance can be signaled either through a high or a low price
depending on the link between environment and competitiveness. The author has used the price as a signal
for environmental performances in his work. Nevertheless, in his work he does not study the asymmetric
problem through a model of price as environmental quality signal as consequences of the presence of two
eco-labels in the market.
Let H(pH ; pL; 
 
pH ; pL

) be rm H prot. This prot depends on the term 
 
pH ; pL

. 
 
pH ; pL

which is the consumers posteriori belief that the rm which o¤ers the price pH really o¤ers a high
environmental quality product while the other rm which o¤res pL is a low environmental quality rm.
Consumers know that there is one rm of each type:

 
pH ; pL

= 1    pL; pH :
Consumers observe the vector of rmsstrategies
 
pH ; pL

and update their believes.
Since for the consumers there is a fty percent chance that rm H or L has a high environmental
quality, we note 0 = 12 : 
0 is the a priori consumers believes.
Firms are symmetric for the consumers in the sense that no rm has a reputation advantage on the
other, this implies that 
 
pi; pi

= 12 i = L;H: In fact, if the two rms set the same price then consumers
posterior believes remain di¤use.
Finally, if 
 
pH ; pL

= 1, then consumers are sure that the rm which o¤ers pH is a high environmental
quality rm. If 
 
pH ; pL

= 12 for the consumers there is a fty percent chance that rm H or L has a
high environmental quality. Finally, if 
 
pH ; pL

= 0; then consumers are sure that the rm which set
pH is a low environmental quality rm.
Let () = qH + (1   )qL: () be the quality that consumers expect to obtain. We have 0 =
12This situation is due to the multiplicity of the eco-labels from the one hand and to the di¤erent direction each label is
retending to be from the other hand.
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qH + qL
2
= 
 
0

.
If the price vector doesnt give any information on the environmental quality demand13 will always be
the same for each rm. It will be equal to:
DI(p; p) = 12(1  p0 ) = 12(1  2pqH+qL ) (4:1)
In this section, the game is as follows: in the rst step, rms H and L with eco-labels LH and LL
compete in environmental qualities. In the second stage, the two rms compete in prices. In the third
stage, the consumers observe prices, update their believes and decide to buy the good H or L or not to
buy.
The aim of this section is to know the real impact of two di¤erent eco-labels on the environmental
qualities when the consumers dont know the environmental qualities o¤ered by the two rms. Is the
global environmental quality level higher or lower than in the complete information case?
5.2 Sequential equilibrium and rmsincentives
5.2.1 Denition of a sequential equilibrium
Denition: a sequential equilibrium is a pair of strategies (p^L; p^H) and a system of believes 
 
pL; pH

such as:
(1) p^L maximizes L
(2) p^H maximizes H
(3) If p^L 6= p^H then   p^L; p^H = 0 and   p^H ; p^L = 1
(4) If p^L = p^H then 
 
p^L; p^H

= 
 
p^H ; p^L

= 12
(5) If
 
pL; pH
 6=  p^L; p^H then   pL; pH+   pH ; pL = 1 and if pL = pH then   pL; pH = 12
(1) and (2) imply that each rm will choose a price that maximizes its prot taking as given the
strategy of the other rm and the belief of the consumers (it is the sequential rationality). The points (3),
(4) and (5) imply that beliefs have to make sense with the structure of the game and with the strategies
of the rms (consistency). If rms choose di¤erent strategies then consumers will be able to know exactly
which rm is a high or a low environmental quality rm. In constrast if the rms choose the same strategy
consumers will then return to their prior beliefs that either rm is the high quality rm.
5.2.2 Firmsincentives
If we assume that rmsstrategies are to set prices equal to the complete information prices pHC ; pLC ;
then their respective prots will be equal to HC ; LC : If we assume now that rms L strategy is to
model rms H strategy and then to set price pHC instead of pLC :
We will have: LI(pHC ; pHC ; 0) = pHCDI   aqL2
By replacing DI and pHC by their respective values dened by (4.1) and (3.3) respectively, we obtain:
LI(pHC ; pHC ; 0) = q
H(qH qL)
4qH qL (1  4
qH(qH qL)
(4qH qL)(qH+qL))  aqL
2
(4:2)
PROPOSITION 214: In the incomplete information case, the low environmental quality
rm has an incentive to replicate the strategy of the high environmental quality rm.
13The proofs are given in the Annex B1.
14The proofs are given in the annex B2.
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This proposition implies that if the low environmental quality rm replicates the high environmental
quality rms strategy then its prots will be higher than in the complete information case.
We assume now that the high environmental quality rm replicates the low environmental quality
rms strategy and sets price pLC instead of pHC :
We have then: HI(pLC ; pLC ; 0) = pLCDI   aqH2
By replacing DI and pLC by their respective values dened by (4.1) and (3.4) respectively, we obtain:
HI(pLC ; pLC ; 0) = 12
qL(qH qL)
4qH qL (1 
2qL(qH qL)
(4qH qL)(qH+qL))  aqH
2
(4:3)
PROPOSITION 315: The high environmental quality rm has no incentive to replicate
rms L strategy.
This proposition implies that if the high environmental quality rm replicates the low environmental
quality rms strategy then its prots will be lower than in the complete information case.
Propositions 2 and 3 that the low environmental quality rm is always incited to mimic the full
information price of the high environmental quality irrespective with the quality di¤erence of the rms.
In contrast, the high environmental quality rm is never incited to mimic the full information price of the
low quality rm. This result implies that the full information prices can never be a separating equilibrium
in the incomplete information case.
5.3 Characterization of a separating equilibrium
We consider a separating equilibrium. In a separating equilibrium each rm will choose di¤erent prices
p^L 6= p^H where p^L < p^H : It is an equilibrium where consumers infer correctly environmental quality levels:

 
p^L; p^H

= 0 and 
 
p^H ; p^L

= 1:
5.3.1 Denition of a separating equilibrium
The price vector
 
p^L; p^H

where p^L < p^H is a separating equilibrium if:
(1) p^L maximizes L(pL; p^H ; 0)
(2) L(p^L; p^H ; 0)  L(p^H ; p^H ; 12)
(3) H(p^H ; p^L; 0)  H(p^L; p^L; 12)
The point (1) implies that given the separation of rms, the low environmental quality rm chooses
its price to maximize its prot.
(2) implies that if L chooses p^L its prot will be higher than its prot if it choose the to mimic the
high environmental price p^H :
(3) implies that H prefers choosing p^H than mimicking L and choosing p^L:
(2) and (3) represent incentive constraints.
We can deduce from (2) and (3) that the strategies vector
 
pLC ; pHC

can never be a separating
equilibrium.
In the next section, we will dene the di¤erent prices possible in a separating equilibrium16.
15The proofs are given in the Annex B3.
16Separating equilibrium is always used to characterize incomplete information case (See Fluet and Garella (2002); Daugh-
ety and Reinganum (2007)).
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5.3.2 Characterization of a separating equilibrium
PROPOSITION 417: If ( p^L; p^H) is a separating equilibrium then:
(a) p^L = 12
qL
qH
p^H (4:4)
(b)
2qH(qH qL)(qH+qL)
(qH+qL)qL+4qH(qH qL) < p^
H <
qH
2
(4qH qL)(qH+qL)(qH qL)
2qH(2qH qL)(qH+qL) qL2 (qH qL) (4:5)
This proposition implies that if any deviation from the equilibrium prices leads to a confusion of the
consumers and therefore consumers will not know which rm is o¤ering which quality. A separating
equilibrium is equilibrium where the rm o¤ering the high environmental quality conveys a signal that
the low environmental quality rm cannot mimic otherwise the equilibrium is pooling (Spence (1973)). It
is equilibrium where consumers can distinguish the high from the low quality rm. Any deviation from
this equilibrium implies that consumers cannot distinguish the high from the low environmental quality
rm.
From (4.5), we can conclude that there is an interval for the existence of p^H :
We can conclude from (4.4) and (4.5), that if we take a p^H from (4.5), it will correspond to a unique
p^L: From (4.5), we can conclude that there exists an interval for the existence of p^H : We let p^Hinf =
2qH
 
qH   qL  qH + qL
(qH + qL) qL + 4qH (qH   qL) : p^
H
inf is the smallest possible value for p^
H :We want to calculate p^Hinf   pHC :
Recall that pHC =
2qH(qH   qL)
4qH   qL :
We have:
p^Hinf   pHC =
2qH(qH qL)(qH+qL)(4qH qL) 2qH(qH qL)((qH+qL)qL+4qH(qH qL))
((qH+qL)qL+4qH(qH qL))(4qH qL)
If we simplify this equation, we obtain:
p^Hinf   pHC =
qL(4qH qL)
((qH+qL)qL+4qH(qH qL))(4qH qL) > 0 (4:6)
This result leads to our next proposition.
PROPOSITION 5: for all p^H in the interval
p^Hinf =
2qH(qH qL)(qH+qL)
(qH+qL)qL+4qH(qH qL) ;
qH
2
(4qH qL)(qH+qL)(qH qL)
2qH(2qH qL)(qH+qL) qL2 (qH qL) = p^
H
sup

; we always have p^H > pHC .
Since p^L = 12
qL
qH
p^H and p^H > pHC , we have equally p^L > pLC :
This proposition implies that separating equilibrium prices are always higher than complete informa-
tion equilibrium prices. This result is due to the competition between the two rms. Indeed, the low
environmental quality rm has a best response that is directly linked with the separate price chosen by the
high environmental quality rm. This result is interesting and can be explained by the following intuition.
Firms manipulate prices because they are in the incomplete information case: they take advantage of the
asymmetric information case. In that way, when consumers see these high prices they will automatically
think that the environmental quality represented by the eco-label is high.
In the proposition 618, we are interested in the existence and conditions of existence of separating
equilibrium.
17The proofs are given in the Annex B4.
18The proofs are given in the Annex B5.
13
The necessary condition (b) of proposition 4 implies that if qL ! qH ; (if the quality di¤erence is small)
then the intensity of the Bertrand competition leads to nul separating prots. It also implies that the
high environmental quality rm is only willing to make marginal distortion of its price above its complete
information price pHC to ensure separation. We conclude therefore that there is a limit or value of the
environmental quality di¤erence noted q dened as the solution of p^Hinf = p^
H
sup . Above q there exists
a separating equilibrium and under it there isnt any separating equilibrium. It follows the following
proposition.
PROPOSITION 6:
(1)  If the low environmental quality rm o¤ers the same quality as the high environ-
mental quality one, then there isnt any separating equilibrium.
(2)  If qH   qL < q then there isnt any separating equilibrium.
(3)  If qH   qL > q then there exists a separating equilibrium.
This proposition establishes that if the quality di¤erence is su¢ ciently large there is an intervalle of
prices

p^Hinf ; p^
H
sup

for the high environmental quality rm that separates it from the low environmental
quality rm. For any p^H 2 p^Hinf ; p^Hsup there exists a unique best response for the low environmental
quality rm.
Furthermore, this proposition implies that any deviation p^L or p^H is suboptimal. A deviation such as 
p^H ; p^H

implies 
 
p^H ; p^H

= 12 : This situation is dominated by 
 
p^L; p^H

= 0: So the low environmental
quality rm is never incited to deviate from p^L: Similarily, the high environmental quality rm is never
incited to deviate of its strategy p^H : If H chooses ~pH > p^L, then it will face no demand because consumers
will think that it o¤ers a low environmental quality product with a higher price than L. If ~pH = p^L then
this situation is dominated by p^H > p^L: If now it chooses ~pH such that ~pH < p^L then we will have

 
~pH ; p^L

= 0: We show in the annex B.5, that rm H isnt incited to choose ~pH instead of p^H .
In the next section, we are interested in environmental quality choice of the third stage of the game.
Recall that the third stage of the game concerns a simultaneous quality competition.
5.4 Quality competition and rmsincitations
We are interested in this section in the third stage of the game where rms compete simultaneously in
qualities19. We want here, especially, to compare the qualities of complete and incomplete information
cases.
5.4.1 Comparison of the revenues of the complete and incomplete information cases
In the incomplete information case, rmsH and L prots are respectively:
H(p^H ; p^L; 1) = (1  p^
H(2qH qL)
2qH(qH qL) )p^
H   aqH2 (4:7)
L(p^L; p^H ; 0) = 14
qL
qH(qH qL) p^
H2   aqL2 (4:8)
In the complete information case, rmsH and L prots are respectively:
HC(pH ; qH ; qL) = (1  p
H(2qH qL)
2qH(qH qL) )p
H   aqH2 (4:9)
LC(pH ; qL; qH) = 14
qL
qH(qH qL)p
HC2   aqL2 (4:10)
19The existence, concavity and stability conditions have been studied in the complete information case and results are
exactly the same.
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Firms H revenues in incomplete and complete information case are respectively:
RH(p^H ; p^L; 1) = (1  p^
H(2qH qL)
2qH(qH qL) )p^
H ;
RH(pHC ; qH ; qL) = (1  p
HC(2qH qL)
2qH(qH qL) )p
HC
Firms L revenues in incomplete and complete information case are respectively:
RL(p^L; p^H ; 0) = 14
qL
qH(qH qL) p^
H2
RL(pHC ; qL; qH) = 14
qL
qH(qH qL)p
HC2
PROPOSITION 7: we show that20:
(1)  RH(p^H ; p^L; 1) > RH(pHC ; qH ; qL)
(2) RL(p^L; p^H ; 0) > RL(pHC ; qL; qH)
Proposition 7 implies that in the incomplete information case, rmsrevenues are always higher of
those obtained in the complete information case. This situation can be explained with proposition 5.
Proposition establishes that the asymmetric information prices are always higher than the complete
information prices. Therefore the revenues of the two rms in the asymetric information case are higher
than in the complete information case. Secondly, we show in proposition 6 that separating equilibrium
exist if the quality di¤erence is su¢ ciently high and in this case the market is well segmented and price
competition is relaxed and revenue are higher.
5.4.2 Quality choice and rmsincitations
PROPOSITION 821: We let q^L and q^H the environmental qualities of rm H and L in the
incomplete information case. In the asymmetric information case, each rm is incited to
choose an environmental quality level lower or equal to their complete information environ-
mental quality. We will have qHC  q^H and qLC  q^L:
This result is very important in our paper. First, this proposition establishes that even if the products
have eco-labels, their environmental qualities can be very low and do not match with the environmental
quality expected or announced by the eco-label. One must notice in this case that it is the multiplicity
of eco-labels that permits rms to practice the "green washing" phenomenon. Second, this proposition
entails that the global level of environmental quality has decreased since the qHC  q^H and qLC  q^L:So
the eco-labels dont reect the real level of the environmental qualities when several eco-labels are present
in the market. Therefore, the consumer will buy a labelled product with a higher price but a lower
environmental quality. Despite the fact that an eco-label is a means to reduce the informational gap
between producers and consumers, consumers will not use the eco-label information to buy the product.
6 Conclusion
The objective of this article was to develop a model which, explains how the presence of several ecological
labels in the same market a¤ects both the information value of these labels and the environmental qualities.
20The proofs are given in the annex B6.
21The proofs are given in the annex B7.
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We have supposed that there are two rms with di¤erent eco-labels in the market. One rm o¤ers the
high environmental quality product and the other the low environmental quality one. We have developed
a complete information model where consumers know perfectly which rm o¤ers the high or the low
environmental quality. Secondly, we have developed an incomplete information model where consumers
dont know which one o¤ers which environmental quality.
Our paper shows two important results:
In the case of complete information the introduction of a second ecological label in a market improves
the environmental qualities o¤ered by the two rms. If rms do not pratice opportunistic behavior (if
each rm o¤er its product with the environmental quality annouced in the eco-label) than the presence
of several eco-labels will increase the global environmental quality.
In the case of incomplete information, the introduction of a second label led to an increase in prices
practiced by the two rms and a reduction in the environmental qualities of both rms.
The improvement of the information related to the environmental quality of the products for the
consumers becomes the principal stake of the environmental policies.
The presence of a second eco-label decreases considerably the global environmental quality level of
both rms. This result is contradictory since an eco-label is a message of a high environmental quality.
When there are multiplicity of ecolabels, the incentives of each rm are to diminish their respective
qualities, and the consumer will not take into account the label in his decision to buy the product.
One solution observed in di¤erent markets is that some rms are applying for several eco-labels at the
same time in order to send a credible signal for consumers.
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ANNEX
Annex A: Complete information case
Annex A.1- Computation of equilibrium prices, stability and concavity
(i)- Equilibrium prices:
Reaction functions of rm H and L are obtained by maximizing (3.1) and (3.2) with respect to pH
and pL respectively:
@H
@pH
= 0, 1  pH pL
qH qL + p
H(  1
qH qL ) = 0
We have @
L
@pL
= 0, pH pL
qH qL   p
L
qL
+ pL(  1
qH qL   1qL ) = 0
We obtain the following reaction functions:
pH(pL) = 12(q
H   qL) + 12pL
pL(pH) = 12
qL
qH
pHwhere pH(pL) and pL(pH) are the reaction functions of H and L respectively.
To obtain equilibrium prices of H and L , we must resolve the system formed by the two reaction
functions. We then nd:
pHC = 2q
H(qH qL)
4qH qL
pLC = q
L(qH qL)
4qH qL
WRT
(ii)- Concavity
We have @
2H
@pH2
=   2
qH qL < 0 and
@2L
@pL2
=   2
qH qL   2qL < 0 : the concavity conditions are veried.
(iii)- Stability conditions:
We must have

@2L
(@pL)
2

@2H
(@pH)
2

  @2L
@pL@pH
@2H
@pH@pL
> 0;
We have:
@2L
(@pL)
2

@2H
(@pH)
2

  @2L
@pH
2
@2H
@pL
2 =   2qH qL

  2
qH qL   2qL

  1
qH qL
1
qH qL

  1
qH qL

  2
qH qL

  2
qH qL   2qL

  1
qH qL
1
qH qL

  1
qH qL

> 0
Stability conditions are satised. WRT
Annexe A2: Concavity and stability conditions for the quality case
(i)- Concavity Conditions:
We have
@2HC
@qH2
=
@2RHC
@qH2
  2a
and
@RHC
@qH
= 4q
H
(4qH qL)3
 
3qH   2qL (4qH   qL)  8(qH3   qLqH2)
Then
@RHC
@qH
= 4q
H
(4qH qL)3

4qH
2
+ 2qL
2   3qLqH

> 0
Similarly:
@2RHC
@qH2
=
= 4
(4qH qL)6

12qH
2
+2qL
2 6qLqH

(4qH qL)3   12  4qH qL2 4qH3+2qHqL2 3qLqH2
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=   8
(4qH qL)4 (5q
HqL
2
+ qL
3
) < 0
Then
@2HC
@qH2
< 0 ; the rst concavity condition is satised.
In the same way, we have @
2LC
@qL2
= @
2RLC
@qL2
  2a
and
@RLC
@qL
= q
H
(4qH qL)3
 
qH   2qL (4qH   qL) + 2(qLqH   qL3)
Then
@RLC
@qL
= q
H2
(4qH qL)3 (4q
H   7qL) > 0 if qH
qL
> 74 :
@2RLC
@qL2
=   qH
2
(4qH qL)4 (16q
H + 14qL) < 0
nally
@2LC
@qL2
< 0
Concavity conditions are satised.
(ii)- Stability conditions
We must verify the following condition:
@2HC
@qH2
@2LC
@qL2
  @
2HC
@qH@qL
@2LC
@qL@qH
> 0
We have:
@2HC
@qH@qL
=
@2RHC
@qH@qL
= 8
(4qH qL)4 (5q
H2qL + qL
2
qH)
Then
@2HC
@qH@qL
=   qH
qL
@2RHC
@qH2
> 0
and
@2LC
@qL@qH
=
@2RLC
@qL@qH
= 2q
H
(4qH qL)4 (7q
L2 + 8qLqH)
Then
@2LC
@qL@qH
=   qL
qH
@2RHC
@qH2
> 0
The stability condition becomes:
@2RHC
@qH2
  2a

@2RLC
@qL2
  2a

 

  qH
qL
@2RHC
@qH2

  qL
qH
@2RHC
@qH2

= A
A= 2a

@2RHC
@qH2

  2a@2RLC
@qL2
+ 4a2 > 0
The stability condition is veried. WRT:
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Annex B: The case of incomplete information
Annex B1: Demand function
U = 0   p is the consumers utility function in the incomplete information case. The consumer
indi¤erent has a null utility thus
 = p
0
:WRT:
Annex B2: Proof for proposition 2:
We have:
LI(pHC ; pHC ; 0) = q
H(qH qL)
4qH qL (1  4
qH(qH qL)
(4qH qL)(qH+qL)   aqL
2
and LC(qL; qH) =
qLqH(qH qL)
(4qH qL)2   aq
L2
LI(pHC ; pHC ; 0)  LC(qL; qH) = q
H(qH qL)
(4qH qL)2(qH+qL)(8q
HqL) > 0
Finally LI(pHC ; pHC ; 0) > LC(qL; qH)
WRT
Annex B.3- Proof for proposition 3:
We have
HI(pLC ; pLC ; 0) = 12
qL(qH qL)
4qH qL (1 
2qL(qH qL)
(4qH qL)(qH+qL))  aqH
2
and HC(qH ; qL) =
4qH
2
(qH qL)
(4qH qL)2   aq
H2
HI(pLC ; pLC ; 0) > HC(qH ; qL) if and only if 
HI(pLC ;pLC ;0)
HC(qH ;qL)
> 1
However, 
HI(pLC ;pLC ;0)
HC(qH ;qL)
= 2 q
L
qH2
1
4qH qL (1 
2qL(qH qL)
(4qH qL)(qH+qL)) < 1
Finally HI(pLC ; pLC ; 0) < HC(qH ; qL)
WRT:
Annex B.4: Characterization of the separating equilibrium: proof for proposition
4
To characterize the separating equilibrium (when it exists) we must analyse the denition.
The rst point (1) of (4.3.1) implies that p^L = 12
qL
qH
p^H
Firms L prot become:
L(p^L; p^H ; 0) =
 
p^H  1
2
qL
qH
p^H
qH qL   12 p^
H
qH
!
1
2
qL
qH
p^H

  aqL2
If we develop this expression we obtain:
L(p^L; p^H ; 0) = 14
qL
qH(qH qL) p^
H2   aqL2
The second point implies that rm L is never incited to mimic the strategy of rm H:
L(p^L; p^H ; 0)  L(p^H ; p^H ; 12)
But L(p^H ; p^H ; 12) =
1
2 p^
H(1  2p^H
qH+qL
)  aqL2
L(p^L; p^H ; 0)  L(p^H ; p^H ; 12)
) 14 q
L
qH(qH qL) p^
H2   aqL2 > 12 p^H(1  2p^
H
qH+qL
)  aqL2
() 14 q
L
qH(qH qL) p^
H2 > 12 p^
H(1  2p^H
qH+qL
)
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() p^H > 2q
H(qH qL)(qH+qL)
(qH+qL)qL+4qH(qH qL)
In the same manner, the third point implies that rm H is never incited to mimic the strategy of rm
L:
H(p^H ; p^L; 0)  H(p^L; p^L; 12)
But H(p^H ; p^L; 1) = (1  p^
H  1
2
qL
qH
p^H
qH qL )p^
H   aqH2
By developing this expression, we obtain:
H(p^H ; p^L; 1) = (1  p^
H(2qH qL)
2qH(qH qL) )p^
H   aqH2
We even have:
H(p^L; p^L; 12) =
1
2 p^
L(1  2p^L
qH+qL
)  aqH2
= 14
qL
qH
p^H(1  qL
qH(qH+qL)
p^H)  aqH2
but H(p^H ; p^L; 1)  H(p^L; p^L; 12)
) (1  p^
H  1
2
qL
qH
p^H
qH qL )p^
H   aqH2 > 14 q
L
qH
p^H(1  qL
qH(qH+qL)
p^H)  aqH2
() (1  p^
H  1
2
qL
qH
p^H
qH qL )p^
H > 14
qL
qH
p^H(1  qL
qH(qH+qL)
p^H)
() p^H < q
H2(4qH qL)(qH+qL)(qH qL)
2qH(2qH qL)(qH+qL) qL2 (qH qL)
Annex B.5: Proof for proposition 6
We must show that none of the rms L and H want to deviate from
 
p^L; p^H

:
Any deviation p^L or p^H is sub optimal. A deviation such that
 
p^H ; p^H

implies 
 
p^H ; p^H

= 12 : This
situation is dominated by 
 
p^L; p^H

= 0: The low environmental quality rm is never incited to deviate
from p^L: In the same manner, the high environmental quality rm is never incited to deviate of its strategy
p^H : If H chooses ~pH > p^L, then it will face no demand because consumers will think that it o¤ers a low
environmental quality product with a higher price than L. If ~pH = p^L then this situation is dominated by
p^H > p^L: If now it chooses ~pH such that ~pH < p^L then we will have 
 
~pH ; p^L

= 0:
We have:
DH = p^
L ~pH
qH qL   ~p
H
qL
, and
H(~pH ; p^L; 0) = ~pH( p^
L ~pH
qH qL   ~p
H
qL
)  aqH2
Prot maximisation with respect to ~pH gives ~pH = q
L
2qH
p^L. Or p^L = q
L
2qH
p^H : This implies that
~pH = q
L2
4qH2
p^H :
We will have: H(~pH ; p^L; 0) = q
L3 (2 qH)
16qH4 (qH qL) p^
H2   aqH2 :
We will show now that H is not incited to choose ~pH more than p^H
We compute H(p^H ; p^L; 1)  H(~pH ; p^L; 0) :
H(p^H ; p^L; 1)  H(~pH ; p^L; 0) =

(1  p^
H(2qH qL)
2qH(qH qL) )p^
H   aqH2

 

qL
3
(2 qH)
16qH
4
(qH qL) p^
H2   aqH2

After computation, we obtain :
H(p^H ; p^L; 1)  H(~pH ; p^L; 0) = p^H

1  16qH
4 8qH3qL+qL3 (2 qH)
16qH4 (qH qL) p^
H

H(p^H ; p^L; 1)  H(~pH ; p^L; 0) > 0
if 1  16qH
4 8qH3qL+qL3 (2 qH)
16qH4 (qH qL) p^
H > 0
=)if p^H < 16qH
4
(qH qL)
16qH4 8qH3qL+qL3 (2 qH)
However, we have p^H <
qH
2
(4qH qL)(qH+qL)(qH qL)
2qH(2qH qL)(qH+qL) qL2 (qH qL) :
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We must show that:
qH
2
(4qH qL)(qH+qL)(qH qL)
2qH(2qH qL)(qH+qL) qL2 (qH qL) <
16qH
4
(qH qL)
16qH4 8qH3qL+qL3 (2 qH)
We have :
qH
2
(4qH qL)(qH+qL)(qH qL)
2qH(2qH qL)(qH+qL) qL2 (qH qL) <
16qH
4
(qH qL)
16qH4 8qH3qL+qL3 (2 qH)
, 2q
H(2qH qL)(qH+qL) qL2(qH qL)
qH2 (4qH qL)(qH+qL)(qH qL)  
16qH
4 8qH3qL+qL3 (2 qH)
16qH4 (qH qL) > 0
, 2
qH(4qH qL)   q
L2
qH2
1
(4qH qL)(qH+qL) >
16qH
4 8qH3qL+qL3 (2 qH)
16qH4 (qH qL) =
8qH
3
(2qH qL)+qL3 (2 qH)
16qH4 (qH qL)
But 16q
H4 8qH3qL+qL3 (2 qH)
16qH4 (qH qL) =
8qH
3
(2qH qL)+qL3 (2 qH)
16qH4 (qH qL) > 0
Because qH 2 [0; 1] :
Finally H is not incited to choose ~pH more than p^H
WRT
Annex B.6: Proof for proposition 7:
We know that p^H > pHC and p^L > pLC :
RH(p^H ; p^L; 1) RH(pH ; qH ; qL) = 1   p^H   pHC   p^H   pHC (2qH qL)
2qH(qH qL)
Or
(2qH qL)
2qH(qH qL) < 1:
Indeed,
(2qH qL)
2qH(qH qL) =
1
(qH qL)(1  q
L
2qH
):
But q
L
qH
< 1; 1
(qH qL)(1  q
L
2qH
) < 1
Finally we have:
RH(p^H ; p^L; 1) RH(pH ; qH ; qL) = A
A=1   p^H   pHC   p^H   pHC (2qH qL)
2qH(qH qL) > 0
We also have:
RL(p^L; p^H ; 0) RL(pHC ; qL; qH) = B
B=14
qL
qH(qH qL)

p^H
2   pHC2

> 0
because p^H > pHC
WRT
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Annex B.7 Proof for proposition 8:
We have
H(p^H ; p^L; 1) = (1  p^
H(2qH qL)
2qH(qH qL) )p^
H   aqH2
L(p^L; p^H ; 0) = 14
qL
qH(qH qL) p^
H2   aqL2
First, we have 
 
p^L; p^H

= 0 and 
 
p^H ; p^L

= 1; then rms are incited to o¤er higher prices and
smallest qualities. They are not incited to set quality levels higher than in the complete information case.
Second, we have RH(p^H ; p^L; 1) > RH(pHC ; qH ; qL): Firm H will decrease its quality to a maximum in
order to maximize its revenue. It will then choose a quality such that qHC  q^H : For rm L, we have
RL(p^L; p^H ; 0) > RL(pHC ; qL; qH); L will choose a quality level that minimises its xed cost aqL
2
: WRT
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